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Abstract—Lately, multimedia encryption has been the focus
of attention in many researches. Recently, a large number
of encryption algorithms has been presented to protect image
contents.The main objective of modern image encryption schemes
is to reduce the computation complexity in order to respond to
the real time multimedia and/or limited resources requirements
without degrading the high level of security. In fact, most of
the recent solutions are based on the chaotic theory. However,
the majority of chaotic systems suffers from different limitations
and their implementation is difficult at the hardware level
because of the non integer operations that are employed requiring
huge resources and latency. In this paper, we analyze the new
chaos-based image encryption system presented in [1]. It uses a
static binary diffusion layer, followed by a key dependent bit-
permutation layer that only iterates for one round. Based on
their results in this paper, we claim that the uniformity and
avalanche effect can be reached from the first round. However,
we tried to verify the results but our conclusion was that these
results were wrong because it was shown that at least 6 iterations
are necessary to ensure the required cryptographic performance
such as the plain-sensitivity property. Therefore, the required
execution time must be multiplied by 6 and consequently this will
increase the latency. In addition to all aforementioned problems,
we find that ensuring the avalanche effect in the whole image
introduces a high error propagation. In order to solve this
problem, we recommend to ensure the avalanche effect in the
level of blocks instead of the whole image.
Index Terms—Avalanche effect; Key derivation function; Key-
dependent P-box ; Key-dependent integer or binary diffusion
matrix; Security analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encrypting images is a necessary requirement to protect
the privacy of people and the confidentiality of image
contents. However, traditional cryptographic techniques,
using symmetric-key standard encryption algorithms such as
DES [2] and AES [3], are not efficient for encrypting images
and video contents due to the intrinsic features of images,
and the strong correlation among the adjacent pixels [4].
Therefore, traditional encryption techniques cannot fit the
real-time delivery of multimedia streams according to [5] and
discovering another solution becomes absolutely necessary.
Another paradigm has been investigated by researchers in
the last decade, which is the ”Chaos” field. Chaos consists
of a non-linear dynamic system that appears to be random.
Due to the extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, chaos was
integrated extensively to build the cryptographic algorithms
of digital images such as in [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13]. Unfortunately, chaos-based encryption algorithms are
not always secure, and most of them have been successfully
crypt-analyzed [14], [15], [16], due to their instability coming
from the periodicity of mapping [17] and the finite computing
precision that renders the system vulnerable to different kinds
of attacks [18], [19]. Additionally, the main disadvantage of
the majority of chaotic encryption algorithms is the use of
floating calculations which makes the practical software or
hardware implementation of such systems not efficient and
complex compared to the traditional ciphers such as AES and
DES, which only operate with integer operations.
Recently, a scheme was presented in [1]. It consists in
applying a static binary diffusion layer followed by a key
dependent bit-permutation based on the periodicity 2D cat map
that only iterates for one round. In fact, the authors indicated
that the avalanche effect can be reached from the first round.
A. Motivation & Contributions
The main motivation of our work is to analyze the previous
work of [1] and to quantify its security and performance level
to validate whether it can be a good encryption candidate or
not.
In this paper, we detail all the weaknesses of this proposal
and we prove that the avalanche effect is not attained. In
addition, we focus on the weak key size permutation technique
and its inflexibility that limits the use of this cipher.
However, according to the tests done in this paper, it is
shown that the sufficient number of iterations r needed to reach
the avalanche effect (plain-sensitivity property) is ≥ 6. There-
fore, the required execution time of this scheme should be
multiplied by 6. Based on the obtained results, we demonstrate
that [1] does not meet the main contribution needed which is
a lower latency. Therefore, we prove that the required latency
and resources are so high to ensure the required robustness
against attacks. In fact, with r = 1, the system is considered
weak against different kinds of attacks such as known/chosen
plain-text/cipher-text attacks. In addition, it cannot be used by
tiny devices such as our smart-phones or sensors because of
the high required memory size. More important, we validate
that it is extremely sensitive against the channel error thus
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preventing its practical implementation. We highlight all these
points and give the correct results that should have been taken
into consideration.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, an analysis of the proposed scheme of [1] is presented
and the weak points are detailed. Moving to Section III, the
false result of the avalanche effect is proved in addition to
quantify the difference between original and cipher images..
Furthermore, the uniformity analysis is done. Then, in Sec-
tion IV, the propagation of error analysis shows that any noise
affecting the channel will prevent the recovery of the original
contents after decryption. The visual degradation analysis was
done by studying PSNR [20] and SSIM [21]. Then, a general
performance analysis in addition to the execution time is
discussed in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, a conclusion
summarizes our work and future works are presented.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED CHAOS-BASED IMAGE
ENCRYPTION SYSTEM
In this section, we analyze the cipher scheme of [1] that
is illustrated in Figure 1. In fact, several points are presented
and prove that the proposed cipher cannot reach the efficiency
and the required cryptographic performance. As a result, this
solution can be seen as unsafe. All details are shown in the
following:
1) Low cryptographic performance and attacks
vulnerability : A low number of rounds r based on
wrong results enables to reduce the execution time.
More important, the security level here is considered
low since the plain sensitivity is very low. This makes
chosen/known plain-text attacks easy. Additionally,
the size of the permutation key used is 4 × q, where
q = dlog2(M)e is dependent on the size of the square
input image (M ×M ), which is feasible for any brute
force attack and specifically for small sized images.
Therefore, this algorithm cannot resist different kinds of
attacks. Also, the static structure of the binary diffusion
matrix which is independent of the key is not preferable
from cryptographic viewpoints and should be dependent
on a generated key to strengthen its security level. Also,
the dimension of the diffusion matrix is fixed, which
removes the flexibility property.
Moreover, in their paper, the authors considered that the
permutation was done only once. Therefore, the chaotic
generator should be iterated once to produce the required
parameters and initial conditions of the permutation tech-
nique that has 32 bit length for M ≤ 256. In fact,
this is not sufficient to ensure a sufficient length of
permutation sub-key and consequently cannot resist the
brute force attacks and is not enough to reach the required
cryptographic performance [22] (see chapter 3).
On the other hand, the generator may require to iterate
twice for M ≥ 256 that means that the length of the
required static pseudo-random bits is 64 and it is also
not sufficient to break the brute force attacks [22]. In
addition to that, as the round of permutation rp=1 and
the permutation technique is periodic, this means that the
produced permutation table has a short period according
to [23]. This paper validates the employment of
different parameters and initial conditions for several
iterations to prevent the periodicity of permutation.
2) Not flexible: The employed permutation technique is
based on the Noura formulation of the 2D cat map
that was previously presented in [24](see page 90-91).
Additionally, the proposition of using invertible binary
diffusion matrix for image encryption was also presented
previously in [24](see page 113-121) and it is not the
original proposition of [1]. Unfortunately, this permuta-
tion technique is not flexible and it requires the size of
the original image to be square. This is another limitation
for this approach since a good approach must be flexible
for any dimension desired by the user.
3) High size of memory: Employing bit permutation instead
of byte permutation increases the required memory size
by a factor of 8, which is unacceptable for different
systems. For example, tiny devices are not able to apply
this approach since their memory is limited.
4) Higher latency: The design of the round function with
the goal to reach the avalanche effect with lower round
number is not achieved. Moreover, the bit permutation
algorithm is realized in the bit level and not in the byte
level as in AES. This introduces an overhead in terms of
execution time since the operation in byte or word level
as in AES is more efficient compared to the bit level as
in DES.
5) Difficulty to adapt to modern devices: Low execution
time and low memory requirements are all mandatory
conditions to have an efficient cipher that can take into
consideration the short life of batteries and the low
resources available especially for tiny devices such as
sensors or smart phones.
6) High error propagation: The analysis scheme has a
trade-off between the avalanche effect and the propa-
gation error. In fact, the obtained result indicates that a
random bit error can destroy the contents of the image,
which is not suitable for some applications, especially in
wireless communication where the channels are subjected
to different kinds of noises [25].
Therefore, all these challenges and weaknesses clearly indicate
that the cipher scheme of [1] is neither efficient nor secure and
cannot be considered as a good image encryption candidate.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE AVALANCHE EFFECT, SENSITIVITY,
AND UNIFORMITY
A. Avalanche effect
Indeed, authors of [1] indicated that the proposed cipher
can reach the Avalanche effect after one iteration ( r=1 see
Figure 7 in [1]), which is not true and it was obtained for a
(a) Encryption Algorithm (b) Decryption Algorithm
Figure 1: Architecture of the encryption(a) and decryption (b) algorithm described [1].
small image size 16×16. Moreover, authors of [1] generalized
the result to one round for the different sizes of any image,
which is not logic. Therefore, the avalanche effect test (see the
next subsection by applying the sensitivity test) was applied
on the described scheme and a different result was found that
is shown clearly in Table I for different sizes of images. It
is clear, in this table, that 6 iterations are needed to reach an
avalanche effect near 50%.
B. Sensitivity
The sensitivity refers to a huge change in the cipher text
in response to a slight change in the original message itself.
A cipher algorithmEK() is considered to be robust against
chosen/known plain-text attacks, if it ensures the avalanche
effect. In other words, the percentage of the Hamming distance
(in bits) between the corresponding cipher image C = Ek(I)
and C ′ = EK(I ′) should be close to 50%, while I and I ′
only differ by one bit. An image I has been chosen that have
all values equal to zero. I ′ is different from I by only one
random pixel that has value equals to one. The sensitivity of
the plain image PS is analyzed for 1000 random plain images
and keys using the percentage of the Hamming distance,which
is calculated as follows:
PSw =
∑
(Byte2bit(Cw)⊕Byte2bit(C ′w))
T
× 100% (1)
=
∑
Byte2bit(EKw(I))⊕Byte2bit(EKw(I ′))
T
× 100%
where T is the length in bits of the original and cipher images,
Cw and C ′w are the corresponding w
th cipher images using Iw
and I ′w and (Kw) secret keys respectively. All the elements of
I ′w are equal to those of Iw, except a random Least Significant
Bit (LSB) of a random byte, which was flipped and w =
1, 2, . . . , 1000.
According to the obtained results, the sufficient number
of rounds, r should be ≥6 to be dependent on the size of
images as shown in Table I and Figure 2, where the size of
images is square (M×M ). Therefore, to reduce the execution
time with a good avalanche degree, r must be set to 6 for
M < 196 and r > 6 for M >= 196. Finally, r equals to
6 is sufficient to reach the avalanche effect for the different
analyzed sizes of images (the maximum size of simulation that
was analyzed was 512× 512). Moreover, the obtained results
illustrated here are reasonable, since increasing the image size
will definitely increase the number of blocks, which requires a
sufficient number of rounds to propagate the difference among
blocks to reach the avalanche effect. Based on that, r cannot
be set to 1 as indicated in [1]. Therefore, a lower degree
of avalanche effect is reached, which means that it cannot
immune the system against chosen/known plain-text attacks
according to their configuration(r = rp = 1). Therefore, this
cipher is insecure with this number of rounds. Consequently,
after these results, r must be 6 to obtain the required level of
security. On the other hand, this will lead to an increase in the
execution time.
Figure 2(a) shows the average values of the percentage
of the Hamming distance over 1000 random dynamic keys
versus the number of rounds r. The obtained results show
that the optimal number of iterations to reach the avalanche
effect is 6 for the different sizes of images. Additionally, to
ensure the independence between the plain and cipher images,
the percentage of the Hamming distance between I and its
corresponding encrypted one C are computed as described
above (see Eq. 2). The obtained results in Figure 2-(b) show
that the independence between the plain and cipher images
requires the same number of iterations of the avalanche effect.
This means that to reach the independence and the avalanche
effect, r should be ≥ 6.
C. Analysis of the uniformity
To resist the common statistical attacks, the encrypted image
should possess certain random properties. The most important
one is that the frequency of each symbol of the encrypted
(a) PS (b) Diff
Figure 2: Variation of the average of the percent of the avalanche effect and the mean difference between plain and cipher-text
over 1000 random keys versus the number of rounds r respectively.
Table I: Variation of the avalanche effect versus the size of image and the number of rounds r.
PPPPPPM
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16× 16 0.3092 4.2415 29.052 45.09 49.39 50.03 49.97
32× 32 0.077 1.135 11.54 40.26 48.29 49.6 49.86
64× 64 0,0193 0,342 5,720 44,70 49,99 50,08 49,64
128× 128 0.004 0.082 1.407 15.00 47.34 50.03 49.9
196× 196 0.0021 0.035 0.52 4.51 39.80 49.95 49.99
256× 256 0.0012 0.0212 0.3366 5.348 42.441 50.01 49.97
300× 300 0.0009 0.0152 0.2588 4.290 38.273 50.04 50.12
512× 512 0.0003 0.005 0.087 1.429 19.688 49.99 50.02
image should be uniform. This means that each symbol has
an occurrence probability close to 1n , where n is the number of
symbols. In order to compute the level of uniformity of each
encrypted image, the Chi-square test is applied as expressed
in Equation 2:
χ2 =
Q−1∑
i=0
(oi − e)2
e
(2)
Where Q is the number of gray levels (here we work with
gray scale images, Q=256), and oi is the observed occurrence
frequencies of each gray level (0-255) and e is the desired
uniform frequency that equals to lenQ , where len is the length
of image in byte level. This statistical test is used to compare
the observed data with a specific hypothesis. Hence, the null
hypothesis is formulated, which is then rejected or retained
with the help of some statistical tests. The probability value
below, which is the null hypothesis, is rejected and is called the
alpha level or simply the ”significant level”. It is conventional
to conclude that the null hypothesis is false if the probability
value is less than 0.05 [26]. The level of significance of
0.05 (or 5%) is often chosen. In fact, with a significance
level of 0.05, researchers can be 95 % confident that the
results represent a non-chance finding [27]. Indeed, with
a significant level of 0.05 and a number of intervals equal
to 256, the chi-square reaches a maximal value equals to
293 [28]. So, all values lower than this value are acceptable
and indicate the uniformity distribution of the histogram.
This criterion is verified by testing the chi-square for the
previous mentioned images I under 1000 different dynamic
keys. Figure 3 shows that the mean chi-square values become
≤ 293 after 6 iterations for all the dimension. This confirms
the previous result and clearly indicates that r ≥ 6 is sufficient
to reach the independence avalanche effect, and uniformity
property of the encrypted image under the proposed algorithm.
However, ensuring the security by reaching the avalanche
effect introduces a hard challenge that is described in the
following. This will have a high impact of a single bit
change in the encrypted image and consequently a hard visual
degradation is obtained and these results are described in the
next section. This indicates clearly that a trade-off between
the avalanche effect and error propagation is reached with this
kind of scheme.
IV. PROPAGATION OF ERRORS
Indeed, an important criterion that should be ensured for any
cipher is the tolerance error, which means that the error is not
propagated. Interference and noise existing in the transmission
channel are the main causes of error. However, a bit error
means that a substitution of ’0’ bit into ’1’ bit or vice versa
will take place. This error may propagate and leads to the
destruction of data, which is a big challenge since a trade-
off between the Avalanche effect and an error propagation
is shown in [29]. In [1], if a bit error takes place in any
Figure 3: Variation of the average of the chi-square test over 1000 random keys versus the number of rounds r respectively,
with Tb = 256.
Figure 4: Variation of the impact of the error propagation according to the percentage of errors.
encrypted block, it will affect the overall decrypted image and
the difference between both decrypted images are calculated
according to Equation 2. The result is presented in Figure 4
which shows that the error is always close to 50%. As a result,
we can deduce that the proposed approach is inefficient to
overcome the propagation error. Therefore, any error in one
byte will propagate to all other bytes which makes the system
powerless against noisy and fading channels.
A. Visual Degradation
This test is specific for image and video contents and
enables to quantify the visual degradation that it reaches
by employing the cipher scheme with the effect of error
propagation. In fact, the degradation operated on the decrypted
image after any single change of any bit prevents the contents
of an image from being recognized. To measure the visual
degradation, two well known parameters are studied to mea-
sure the encryption visual quality which are Peak Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Structural Similarity Index (SSIM).
PSNR is derived from the Mean Squared Error (MSE),
while MSE represents the cumulative squared error between
an original and an encrypted image. A lower PSNR value
indicates that there is a high difference between the original
and the cipher images.
In addition, another metric is used and called Structural SIM-
ilarity (SSIM) index [16], which is defined after the Human
Visual System (HVS) and quantifies the similarity between
two images. SSIM is in the interval [0,1]. A value of 0 means
that there is no correlation between the original and the cipher
images, while a value close to 1 means that both images are
approximately the same. In this context, PSNR and SSIM
are measured between two decrypted Lena images (where the
second decrypted image corresponds to the encrypted image
with a percent of error). Indeed, in Figure 5-(a) and (b), PSNR
and SSIM are shown respectively. As shown, the variation of
PSNR and SSIM versus the percentage of errors is presented.
This low value validates that the proposed cipher provides
a high difference between both decrypted images from the
lower error percentage. This means that a high and hard visual
distortion is obtained from a small error percentage. Therefore,
the cipher algorithm cannot be employed in practical systems
that suffer from the error channel.
Moreover, in Table II the results are clearly showing the
values of PSNR, SSIM and Dif . Dif is the sensitivity test
that measures the difference between two decrypted images
with a percentage of errors introduced in the encrypted image
(we suppose that it is the effect of a channel noise in the
encrypted image). It is close to 50%, which is relatively a high
value that will prevent the recovery of the original image. As a
conclusion, the proposed scheme suffers from the hard visual
degradation caused by the channel error. This means that no
useful visual information or structure about the original image
could be revealed from the decrypted image if any error in the
channel is introduced.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In practice, it is very important that the cipher requires
less latency, memory and lower resources for the cipher-
ing/deciphering process in order to be considered efficient.
The presented encryption scheme employs bit permutation
on the overall image, which requires a huge memory size
and prevents its employment in tiny devices. The proposed
scheme must undertake a higher number of rounds (r = 6)
and consequently requires 5 times overhead in addition to the
one presented in [1]. Thus, this proposal is not efficient in
tiny devices which are battery limited and cannot respond to
the needs of real time applications. In addition, the required
size of memory and the execution time should always be at a
minimum to reach a good encryption candidate.
A. Discussion and Cryptanalysis: Resistance against the well-
known types of attacks
In the following, the typical cryptanalytic cases appear-
ing in the literature are considered and a brief analysis of
the proposed cipher against several cryptanalytic attacks is
provided. The proposed cipher algorithm is considered to
be public and the cryptanalyst has a complete knowledge
about the employed confusion and diffusion primitives to
know the technique used to build them but no knowledge
about the secret key is available. The previous scheme of [1]
can be broken by employing different types of attacks. It is
not sufficient to achieve the required level of security since
the scheme fails to resist statistical attacks (uniformity is
not attained) in addition to chosen/known plain-text attacks.
Therefore, differential attacks are based on studying the re-
lation between two encrypted images resulting from a slight
change, usually one bit difference compared to the original
one. A successful sensitivity test shows how much a slight
change in the plain-image or in the key will affect the resulted
cipher image. Moreover, the key space used is fixed and can be
24×q , which is not sufficient to prevent the brute-force attack.
Finally, the problem of single image failure and accidental
key disclosure is not taken into consideration by this scheme.
Furthermore, differential and linear attacks would become
effective. Therefore, this cipher cannot resist different kinds
of attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we analyzed the previous cipher presented
in [1]. In fact, we proved that this scheme has different
weaknesses such as the wrong avalanche effect reached in
addition to a short size of permutation key. This leads to
consider the system insecure against different kinds of attacks.
More important, error propagation was studied and its results
were devastating on the decryption side since no useful data
can be obtained when any bit is subjected to a channel noise.
Therefore, this solution is not efficient since it requires a huge
memory size, higher latency and cannot resist the channel
error. In addition, it is not secure since it cannot face powerful
attacks. These results are presented in order to prove the non
credibility and the unsafe employment of [1]. For future works,
we aim to build an efficient and secure lightweight image
encryption scheme that will overcome all the stated challenges
details in this paper.
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